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A. Context
Federalism is still a nascent concept 
in Nepal, and the structural changes 
associated to the institutionalization 
of federalism are ongoing 
(Adhikari and Shrestha, 2019). The 
Constitution promulgated in 2017 
prescribes a three-tier governance 
system consisting of federal, 
province and local governments. 
These three independent government 
units are provided with exclusive 
rights to prepare and execute their 
own budget. During the fiscal year 
2074/75(2017/18), all 7 provinces 
prepared for the first time their 
trimester budget, and this marked 
the beginning of a new era of fiscal 
federalism in Nepal. In this paper, 
our aim is to compare and analyze 
the fiscal performance of all 7 
provinces, as reflected in the budget. 
B. Federal Administrative 
Structure
The new federal structures have 
resulted in several administrative and 
structural adjustments in the country. 
The present structure consists of 77 
districts and 753 local units. The local 
units are made up of 6 metropolitan 
and 11 sub-metropolitan cities, 276 
municipalities (nagar palikas) and 
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In Nepal, obstacles and mal 
practices experienced at the federal 
level have been cascaded down to 
lower tiers of the government. The 
province governments have carried 
out the financial legacy of federal 
government, a legacy which has 
drawn much criticisms for its 
failure to ensure transparency and 
accountability. The spending of 
province and local governments 
has not been as expected. This 
has largely stifled development 
activities. 
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460 village bodies (gaun palikas). Approximately 60% of 
the country's population are living urban areas. Provinces 
have emerged as a second-tier government, each having 
its own governance and administrative structures. All 
7 provinces have finalized their capital cities, and 4 
provinces have agreed on their names. The table below 
presents an overall macro-economic scenario of all 7 
provinces.
Table 1: Macro economic scenario of provinces
Province Capital Districts Area Population GDP (In billion NRs.) %
Province 1 Biratnagar 14 25,905 km² 45,34,943 505.85 14.60
Province 2 Janakpur 8 9,661 km² 54,04,145 444.50 12.83
Bagmati Hetauda 13 20,300 km² 55,29,452 1432.76 41.36
Gandaki Pokhara 11 21,504 km² 24,03,757 288.21 8.32
Province 5 Butwal 12 22,288 km² 44,99,272 452.80 13.07
Karnali Birendranagar 10 27,984 km² 15,70,418 119.26 3.44
Sudurpaschim Godawari 9 19,539 km² 25,52,517 220.96 6.38
Nepal 77 147,181 km² 26,494,504 3464.32 100.00
Source: Regional (Provincial) National Accounts (2019), CBS / GDP based on current price
The province administration includes ministries and 
other constitutional bodies. The following six ministries 
and seven constitutional bodies are functioning in each 
province of the country:
Ministries Constitutional bodies and entities
1. The Ministry for 
Economic Affairs and 
Planning (which includes 
finance)
2. Ministry for Internal 
Affairs and Law
3. Ministry for Physical 
Infrastructure and 
Development
4. Ministry for Land 
Management, Agriculture 
and Co-Operatives
5. Ministry for Social 
Development (which 
includes education and 
health)
6. Ministry for Industry, 
Tourism, Forest and 
Environment
1. Provincial Assembly
2. Office of the Chief 
Minister and Council of 
Ministers (OCMCM).
3. Office of Chief of 
Province 
4. Province Attorney 
General
5. Province Planning 
Commission
6. Province Public Service 
Commission
7. Province Treasury 
Controller Office
C. PFM Architecture
Public financial management (PFM) concerns planning, 
budgeting, accounting, reporting and auditing. Different 
units are responsible for handling each of these PFM 
elements. The Constitution of Nepal has codified the 
authority of different institutions, including the Financial 
Comptroller General Office (FCGO), the Auditor General 
Office (AGO), and National Natural Resources and Fiscal 
Commission (NNRFC) for the effective facilitation of 
financial administration in the country. Part 22 of the 
Constitution has empowered the AGO to undertake 
auditing of all federal, provincial-level and local 
government units, including the constitutional bodies. 
This is further elaborated in Section 3 of the Audit Act 
2075. Section 5 of the Federal Financial Procedures and 
the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2017 have authorized the 
FCGO to consolidate the financial statements prepared 
by government units at all levels, including the province 
and local levels. The same article also empowers the 
FCGO to develop the accounting formats and systems 
that can be used by government units; this is, however, 
subject to approval by the AGO. In 2009, the Ministry 
of Finance, the FCGO, has approved the use of a set 
of Nepal Public Sector Accounting Standard (NPSAS) 
when reporting the accounts. The FCGO monitors that 
the financial statements prepared by government units 
adhere to the requirements as set out in the NPSAS. 
The FCGO has made several institutional and statutory 
changes for the smooth facilitation of fiscal federalism. 
A major intervention has been the revision of the Chart 
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of Accounts (COAs), making them compatible with the 
new federal set-up. The use of the COAs has resulted 
in promoting uniformity in accounting practice and 
reporting across all three tiers of the government. In 
addition, the FCGO is in the process of enacting a new 
financial procedure and responsibility regulation to guide 
the consolidation of accounts at the province and local 
levels. The establishment of other provincial institutions 
such as the Provincial Treasury Controller Office, the 
Provincial Planning Commission and the Provincial 
AGO is also under way.  Few provincial governments 
have already developed their provincial financial 
procedure act, and they are in fact ahead of the federal 
government in terms of issuing similar procedures at the 
central level. More recently, the parliament has endorsed 
several bills relating to the decentralization of financial 
administration, including a National Natural Resources 
and Fiscal Commission Bill, an Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Transfer Bill, and a Civil Service Adjustment Bill. It is 
expected that the enforcement of these regulations and 
acts would help set up a firm structure for financial 
federalism in the country. 
D. Provincial Budget Allocation and Execution 
Setting up provincial budget was a challenging endeavor. 
All seven provinces struggled when preparing their 
first budget due to limited experience, capacity and IT 
systems.  At that time, the guidelines for an annual budget 
preparation, the medium-term expenditure framework, the 
periodic plans were absent. A web-based software system, 
SuTRA, which was provided by the federal government, 
significantly helped the province governments to prepare 
their budget and annexes. In the following years, these 
challenges envisaged in the budget preparation were 
gradually addressed through the enactment of appropriate 
guidance and regulations. Some provinces enacted up to 
52 acts and regulations, some of which were related to 
budget preparation and execution, during the year.  The 
table below shows the initial budget prepared by all seven 
provinces through the mobilization of the federal fiscal 
equalization grants. The Bagmati province has the largest 
volume of budget compared with other provinces. 
Table 2: Province budget for past four years
Province
Total budget (Rs, billion)
074/75 075/76 076/77 077/78
One 1.02 35.93 42.20 40.90
Two 1.02 29.78 38.72 33.56
Bagmati 1.02 35.61 47.60 51.43
Gandaki 1.02 24.20 32.13 34.84
Five 1.02 28.90 36.41 36.35
Karnali 1.02 28.28 34.35 33.74
Sudurpaschim 1.02 25.60 28.16 33.38







Province budget 3 year (in '000)
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The execution of the provincial budget is largely 
unsatisfactory.  A trend of the high last quarter spending 
is observed in all provinces. Capital expenditures 
are relatively low when comparing with recurrent 
expenditures. The table below depicts the reality of the 
first budget in effect, as the spending within a period of 
three months was around 35.23% of the total allocation. 
Most provinces spent budget on activities such as office 
establishment, vehicle purchase and training. During 
the fiscal year 2018/19, the overall budget spending was 
around 56.39% of the total allocation; another example 
of unsatisfactory performance. A large portion of the 
current year budget (2019/2020) is being spent on staff 
adjustments (Karmachari Samayojan). Below we have 
compared the budget and actual expenditures of all seven 
provinces for the last three years.





Province Current Capital Total % of  utilization
Province 1 1.02 0.44 0.22   0.65 63.97%
Province 2 1.02 0.34 0.27   0.61 60.13%
Bagmati Province 1.02 0.15 0.12   0.27 26.41%
Gandaki Province 1.02 0.15 0.15   0.30 28.95%
Province 5 1.02 0.13 0.07   0.19 18.70%
Karnali Province 1.02 0.12 0.11   0.23 22.96%
Sudurpaschim  
Province 1.02 0.17 0.09   0.26 25.46%
Total 7.15 1.48 1.04 2.52 35.23%
FY 2075-76 (2018-19)
Budget
Actual Expenditure  
Province Current Capital Total % of  utilization
Province 1 35.74   9.80 11.44   21.24 59.44%
Province 2 28.79   6.63   8.47   15.10 52.44%
Bagmati Province 35.62 11.10   9.56   20.66 57.99%
Gandaki Province 22.62   5.24   8.72   13.96 61.69%
Province 5 28.09   6.88 12.63   19.51 69.45%
Karnali Province 27.28   4.54   5.42  9.95 36.48%
Sudurpaschim Province 25.07   6.93   7.23   14.17 56.52%




-6 Months  
Province Current Capital Total % of  utilization
Province 1 35.58 2.48 5.18  7.66 21.52%
Province 2 29.72 1.96 0.72  2.68 9.01%
Bagmati Province 40.86 2.56 2.27  4.83 11.82%
Gandaki Province 25.35 1.77 3.66  5.43 21.42%
Province 5 31.42 3.85 3.65  7.50 23.87%
Karnali Province 24.66 1.38 0.80  2.19 8.87%
Sudurpaschim Province 23.32 1.66 1.56  3.21 13.78%
Total 210.90 15.65  17.84 33.49 15.88%
Source: FCGO CFS 2018/19 and Economic survey 2019/20
The tables show that the budget execution rate is higher 
in province 5, as compared with other provinces. During 
this fiscal year, it is expected that the budget execution 
rate would exceed 60% in this province. This failure to 
execute the entire allocation clearly signals unsatisfac-
tory performance, as well as a problem in implementing 
the PFM reforms agreed on. Another issue concerns the 
quality of spending, which is even more worrisome from 
the governance and accountability aspects. 
E. Fiscal Arrangements
In the current structure, fiscal transfers from federal to 
province and local governments are organized in the form 
of grants and transfers. These transfers are made on the 
basis of resources required by these governments, as well 
as their capacity to raise revenues. The National Natural 
Resource and Fiscal Commission (NNRFC) has devel-
oped formulas for resource allocation, considering the 
macro-economic factors in effect and other requirements 
as laid down by the federal government. As outlined in 
the Intergovernmental Fiscal Arrangement Act of 2074, 
there are 4 different types of grants available to province 
and local governments:
1. Fiscal equalization grants
2. Conditional grants
3. Matching grants 
4. Special grants
These grants are also mentioned and defined in Article 
60 of the Constitution. The Constitution states that: “The 
Government of Nepal shall, on the basis of the need 
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of expenditure and revenue capacity, distribute fiscal 
equalization grants to the province and local level. Each 
Province shall, in accordance with the province law, 
distribute fiscal equalization grants out of the grants 
received from the Government of Nepal and revenues 
collected from its sources, on the basis of the need of 
expenditure and revenue capacity of its subordinate 
local level". The distribution of conditional, matching 
and special grants is mobilized through the Federal 
Consolidated Fund, following the Intergovernmental 
Fiscal Arrangement Act and the NNRFC. Grants received 
by each province in the last three years are presented in 
the table below:
Table 4: Fiscal transfers to sub federal governments 
(Figures in Rs Billion)
Level of Governments Province Local Total
Fiscal Year 076/77 077/78 076/77 077/78 076/77 077/78
Fiscal Equalization 
grant 55.3 55.19 89.95 90.5 145.25 145.69
Conditional grant 44.55 36.35 124 161 168.55 197.35
especial grant 5 3.14 5 6.83 10 9.97
Matching grant 5 5.19 5 4.78 10 9.97
Revenue sharing 65 61.07 65 61.07 130 122.14
Total 175 161 289 324 464 485
Ratio of transfer 
with respect to  
federal budget (%)
11.41 10.92 18.86 21.99 30.27 32.91
Each local/province government is now allowed to raise 
certain revenue, and this has resulted in the readjustment 
of the equalization grant provided to them. In the last two 
fiscal years, the federal government has allocated NRs. 
10 billion for special grants and another NRs. 10 billion 
for matching grants, the transfer of which are based on 
demands made by the province and local governments. 
The table below shows the fiscal equalization grants 
approved to all seven provinces in the last three years:
Table 5: Fiscal equalization grant to provincial 
governments (Figures in NRs Billion)
Province 074/75 075/76 076/77 077/78
Province 1 1.02 6.61 8.16 8
Province 2 1.02 7.02 7.09 7.02
Bagmati Province 1.02 5.97 7.6 7.72
Gandaki Province 1.02 6.78 7.11 7.11
Province 5 1.02 6.87 7.54 7.64
Karnali province 1.02 9.13 9.85 9.63
Sudurpaschim province 1.02 7.92 7.95 8.07
Total 7.14 50.3 55.3 55.19
Figure: Fiscal Equalisation grant to provinces
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The amount provided to each province, as part of the fis-
cal equalization grants, vary based on the formula-based 
allocation method adopted by the federal government. In 
comparison, Karnali province has received more grants, 
as this province has fewer sources to raise revenue.  The 
perceived resource gap has been filled out using the fiscal 
equalization grants.
F. Revenue Sources and Borrowing 
Arrangements
The Constitution of Nepal has codified exclusive and 
shared rights to raise revenues at local levels in Schedule 
5, 6 and 8. However, several challenges are envisaged 
when generating revenues through the mobilization of 
local sources (OSR). A large number of taxes imposed 
are in fact reckoned to be shared taxes.; house rent taxes 
serving as an example. As a result, many citizens are 
experiencing a bitter reality of federalism, as they are 
exposed to multiple taxes imposed by governments at 
different levels.  Few examples of tax overlapping are 
presented in the table below:






We a l t h / p r o p e r t y 
tax(e.g. land tax) Customs
House rent tax Excise duties
Business registration tax VAT
Land revenue tax Agro-income tax Individual income tax
House and land regis-
tration fee
House and land 
registration fee Business income tax
Motor vehicle tax Motor vehicle tax Passport and visa fees
Service charges Service charges Service charges
Tourism fees Tourism fees Tourism fees
Advertising tax Advertising tax  
Penalties Penalties Penalties
Entertainment tax Entertainment tax  
The Intergovernmental Fiscal Arrangement Act provides 
several provisions relating to tax administration. For in-
stance, the act states: 
•	 While collecting income tax, the federal government 
should also include the tax on agricultural income, 
this tax has to be levied by the State,
•	 While collecting vehicle tax, the province should also 
collect the vehicle tax levied by the local government,
•	  While collecting house rent tax, the local govern-
ment should also include the income tax levied on 
house rent, as part of the income tax collected by the 
federal government, 
•	 While collecting house and land registration fee, the 
local government should also include the registration 
fee levied by the State,
•	 While collecting advertising tax, the local govern-
ment should also collect the advertising tax levied by 
the State,
•	 While collecting entertainment tax, the local govern-
ment should also include the entertainment tax levied 
by the State.
The sharing ratio of the revenue collected by each level 
of government also varies. According to the provision, 
2% administration fee is charged by each tier of govern-
ment on natural resources, as part of royalties. Details on 
charging royalties on natural resources are depicted on 
the table below:
Royalties on natural resources
Electricity production, forestry, mountaineering, mining and 
minerals
•	 50% to the federal government;
•	 25% to respective province governments; and
•	 25% to respective local governments.
Province and local governments are required to share 
the collected revenue, using the formula provided by the 
NNRFC. At the federal level, the FCGO makes necessary 
arrangements for a transfer and distribution of the divis-
ible amounts. The table below shows the total revenue 
generated and shared by province governments:
Table 6: Revenue Sharing by federal to provincial 
government (Figures in Rs Billion)
Province 075/76 076/77 077/78
Province 1 8.93 10.28 9.54 
Province 2 8.48 10.44 9.52 
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Bagmati 9.00 10.60 9.70 
Gandaki 6.58   7.71 7.57 
Province 5 8.55   9.91 9.47 
Karnali 5.52   7.44 7.40 
Sudhurpaschim 6.77   7.99 7.87 
Total 53.83 64.37 61.07 
Source: MOF, Inter governmental fiscal transfer 2075-76, 2076-77
During the fiscal year 2017/18, limited revenues were 
generated at the province and local levels.  However, the 
share of revenues generated by province governments has 
increased in 2019/2020, as there is more clarity on this 
issue. 
G. Borrowing
All levels of governments (Federal, Province and Local) 
can borrow money from the domestic financial markets 
being within the limit prescribed by the National Natural 
Resources and Fiscal Commission. However, only the 
federal government has the authority to borrow externally 
and to accept foreign grants. The government of Nepal 
is required to ensure macro-economic stability while 
authorizing external borrowing. Many provinces have 
already started internal borrowing, as part of filling the 
resource gap.  Raising loans to address budget deficits is 
not permitted. 
H. Audit Irregularities
The federal legacy has endured at all levels when it 
comes to audit irregularities. The level of irregularities 
is peculiarly high in certain provinces. For instance, 
province number 2 has the highest level of irregularities, 
which account nearly 23% of its total budget expenditures. 
What is striking is a rise in the level of irregularities 
every year. Karnali is perhaps an exception where the 
percentage of irregularities is relatively low. The table 
below depicts the total audited amounts and irregularities 
for the fiscal year 074/75:





Irregularities amount (In NRs, 000) 
% of  
irregularitiesRecoverable Regularize Advance  irregularity Total
Province 1 656,895 112   22,114 116  22,342 3.4%
Province 2 694,395   20,579   36,930 107,100 164,609 23.7%
Bagmati 274,629 3 969 - 972 0.4%
Gandaki 296,377   83 5 452 540 0.2%
Province 5 203,540 218 290 - 508 0.2%
Karnali 237,852 105   72 - 177 0.1%
Sudurpaschim 261,905 5,959 - - 5,959 2.3%
Total 2,625,593   27,059   60,380 107,668 195,107 7.4%
I. Conclusion
Decentralization of public service is paramount to ripe 
the benefits of democracy. However, the very objective 
of decentralization through the state restructuring has 
encountered several challenges in Nepal. Indeed, the 
complex nature of financial federalism is also evident 
in developed countries (Jochimsen, 2018; Adhikari and 
Shrestha, 2019; Ter-Minassia et al., 2017). In Nepal, 
obstacles and mal practices experienced at the federal 
level have been cascaded down to lower tiers of the 
government. The province governments have carried 
out the financial legacy of federal government, a legacy 
which has drawn much criticisms for its failure to 
ensure transparency and accountability. The spending 
of province and local governments has not been as 
expected. This has largely stifled development activities. 
The expenditure trend is usually high in the last quarter of 
the year, creating a space for corruption and malpractices 
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to flourish. Having said this, there are many issues 
which give us a great deal of hope for the future. For 
instance, all provincial governments have now enacted 
necessary financial regulations and set up institutions, 
the effective mobilization of which could easily improve 
accountability and efficiency at the local/provincial levels. 
What is important is therefore to enforce the regulations, 
invest on the capacity development of administrators 
and strengthen the monitoring mechanisms of oversight 
institutions. Good governance and accountability are 
also paramount to address the challenges posed by the 
pandamic.
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